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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the SADC constitutional norm on the absolute 
prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power1 in light of the 2017 
change of power in Zimbabwe. That year, the country underwent a 
correction of governance from a Mugabe-contrived family dynasty to 
sovereign control of Zimbabwe’s peoples. This Article shows that this 
constitutional norm is a blunt tool. Its operationalization has enormous 
potential to subjugate SADC populations to totalitarian rule by 
shielding unpopular and illegitimate leaders from popular challenge 
once they have set their hands on the levers of power and integrated 
1 See Muna Ndulo, The Prohibition of Unconstitutional Change of Government, in THE 
AFRICAN UNION: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK—A MANUAL ON THE PAN-
AFRICAN ORGANIZATION 251–74 (Abdulqawi A. Yusuf & Fatsah Ouguergouz eds., 2012); 
Ademola Abass, Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and 
Challenges, 24 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L., 933–46 (2013); Gerhard Kemp & Selemani 
Kinyunyu, The Crime of Unconstitutional Change of Government (Article 28E), in THE 
AFRICAN CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE MALABO PROTOCOL 57–70 
(Gerhard Werle & Moritz Vormbaum eds., 2017); AFRICA’S NEW PEACE AND SECURITY 
ARCHITECTURE: PROMOTING NORMS, INSTITUTIONALIZING SOLUTIONS (Ulf Engel & João 
Gomes Porto eds., 2010); Hélène Tigroudja, The African Charter on Democracy, Elections 
and Governance, in THE AFRICAN UNION: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK—A 
MANUAL ON THE PAN-AFRICAN ORGANIZATION 275–90 (Abdulqawi A. Yusuf & Fatsah 
Ouguergouz eds., 2012); SOLOMON AYELE DERSSO, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES OF 
GOVERNMENT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES IN AFRICA (2016), https://sites.tufts. 
edu/wpf/files/ 2017/07/2.-UCG-Dersso-f.pdf. 
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themselves into the SADC Assembly of Heads of States and 
Governments.2 Had it been successfully implemented against 
Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy as intended by Zambia and 
others, the norm would have severely restricted Zimbabwe’s ancient 
and enduring constitutional convention of Chimurenga/Inkululekho/ 
Resistance of oppression, which has the support of United Nations 
standards on good governance.3 This Article recommends the urgent 
development by the SADC of a parallel constitutional normative 
structure requiring the absolute sanctity of the national assembly ballot 
as a precondition to implementation of the absolute prohibition of 
unconstitutional takeover of power. The new norm should also have a 
similar, if not stronger, monitoring and enforcement mechanism.  
INTRODUCTION 
he process to correct Zimbabwe’s governance destiny from a 
Mugabe-contrived family dynasty rule to protection of sovereignty 
of its peoples began to unfold on November 6, 2017, when President 
Mugabe sacked the Vice President of Zimbabwe, accusing him of 
disloyalty.4 This was a high watermark in the long-running leadership 
succession battles within the ruling Zimbabwe African National 
Union–Patriotic Front Party (ZANU–PF) to replace President Mugabe, 
who had ruled the country for thirty-seven years. The move was widely 
characterized as the last move to ensure that the President’s wife, Grace 
Mugabe, would be in place to succeed her husband as President of 
Zimbabwe. In December 2014, Grace Mugabe had been elevated to 
Head of the ZANU–PF National Women’s League,5 a position that 
2 The SADC Assembly of Heads of States and Governments is the SADC’s executive 
decision-making body. 
3 See G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 25 (Mar. 23, 1976). 
4 See MacDonald Dzirutwe, Robert Mugabe Sacks Zimbabwe Vice President Emmerson 
Mnangagwa, THE INDEPENDENT (Nov. 6, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ 
world/africa/robert-mugabe-sacks-vice-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-zimbabwe-
a8040341.html (The decision was quashed by a decision of Judge President Chiweshe on 
November 24, 2017, following an application by Emmerson Mnangagwa before his 
inauguration as President on the same day); see also Charles Laiton, Court Nullifies Mugabe’s 
Dismissal of Mnangagwa, NEWSDAY (Nov. 25, 2017), https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/11/ 
court-nullifies-mugabes-dismissal-mnangagwa/. 
5 See Andrew England, Grace Mugabe Named as Head of Zanu-PF Women’s League, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/ebbcb6fc-7e35-11e4-87d9-
00144feabdc0. 
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instantaneously catapulted her into the ruling party’s policy-making 
body—the politburo. 
The sacking of Vice President Mnangagwa—later annulled by High 
Court Order6 on November 24, 2017—was followed immediately by 
two developments. The first was the swift public endorsement of Grace 
Mugabe as the person most suited to replace Vice President 
Mnangagwa by several ZANU–PF organs, including Provincial and 
National Women’s League formations and Youth League formations. 
However, it was the military’s response that shaped Zimbabwe’s 
response to the question of whether the contrived family dynasty 
governance of Zimbabwe would prevail.  
The Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) launched Operation Restore 
Legacy with an address on November 13, 2017, by General 
Constantino Chiwenga: 
The current purging of which is clearly targeting members of the 
party with a liberation background must stop forthwith. The known 
counter-revolutionary elements who have fermented the current 
instability in the Party (ZANU (PF)) must be exposed and fished out. 
As the Party goes for the Extraordinary Congress, (members) must 
go with equal opportunity to exercise their democratic rights . . .  
The following morning, military spokesman Major General Sibusiso 
Moyo took to the airwaves to announce that following the previous 
day’s address by General Chiwenga, the situation in the country had 
moved to “another level.”7 The only clarification offered was as 
follows: 
Firstly we wish to assure our nation, His Excellency, the president of 
the Republic of Zimbabwe and commander-in-chief of the Zimbabwe 
Defence Forces, comrade R. G. Mugabe and his family, are safe and 
sound and their security is guaranteed. We are only targeting 
criminals around him who are committing crimes that are causing 
social and economic suffering in the country in order to bring them 
to justice. 
6 Justice Chiweshe ruled that “[t]he dismissal of the applicant (Mnangagwa) by Robert 
Gabriel Mugabe, the then President of Zimbabwe, from the office of Vice-President of 
Zimbabwe on November 6, 2017 is null and void and accordingly, of no force or effect.” 
Maveriq, High Court Says Mugabe’s Decision to Fire Mnangagwa is Null and Void, 
PINDULA NEWS (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.herald.co.zw/in-defence-of-the-nations-
founding-values-gains-of-independence-2/.  
7 In Defense of the Nation’s Founding Values, Gains of Independence, THE HERALD 
(Nov. 16, 2017, 12:11 AM), https://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2017/nov/15/the-situation-has-moved-to-another-level-zimbabwe-army-
statement-in-full (citing statement by military spokesman Major General S.B. Moyo). 
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 As soon as we have accomplished our mission we expect that the 
situation will return to normalcy.8 
President Mugabe was placed under house arrest.9 Some members 
of his cabinet, allegedly aligned to his wife’s G40 faction in the long-
running presidential succession battle within the ruling ZANU–PF 
Party, were placed in custody. The military’s intervention appeared to 
have consensual support of the entire nation, which perceived the 
intervention largely as a messianic move to stop the Mugabes’ attempt 
to capture and subvert Zimbabwe’s revolutionary legacy that is 
traceable to the first Matabele rebellion of 1893,10 followed by the First 
Chimurenga (1896–97),11 and later by the Chinhoyi Battle of 1966 or, 
as it is better known—the Second Chimurenga.12 The latter had 
escalated the protracted, armed struggle for independence until the 
cease-fire of 1979, followed by granting of political independence from 
Britain the next year.  
The legacy invoked under Operation Restore Legacy was one of 
rejecting and actively resisting oppression—known as Chimurenga in 
the Shona language and Inkululekho in the Ndebele language. In this 
instance, the oppression was summed up in Mugabe’s attempt to 
8 Id. 
9 See Jeffrey Moyo & Norimitsu Onishi, Zimbabwe’s Military, in Apparent Takeover, 
Says It Has Custody of Mugabe, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/11/14/world/africa/zimbabwe-mugabe-mnangagwa-chiwenga.html [hereinafter Moyo 
& Onishi, Zimbabwe’s Military]; Jeffrey Moyo & Norimitsu Onishi, Robert Mugabe Under 
House Arrest as Rule Over Zimbabwe Teeters, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/11/15/world/africa/zimbabwe-coup-mugabe.html?action=click& 
contentCollection=Africa&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article 
[hereinafter Moyo & Onishi, House Arrest]. 
10 This was “the first serious fight between blacks and whites in Rhodesia.” J.V. 
Woolford, The Matabele War, Part I, 28 HISTORY TODAY, (Aug. 1978), 
http://www.historytoday.com/jv-woolford/matabele-war-part-i. 
11 The First Chimurenga war broke out in the Zimbabwean plateau from 1896 to 1897 
between the white colonizers and the indigenous Shona and Ndebele communities. “The 
war was as a result of the locals’ resistance to colonisation at the hands of the British.” First 
Chimurenga, PINDULA (Aug. 28, 2018, 11:50 AM), https://www.pindula.co.zw/First_ 
Chimurenga. 
12 On April 28, 1966, a group of seven ZANLA fighters infiltrated Zimbabwe from 
Zambia and engaged Rhodesian colonial forces at Chinhoyi. The seven, David Guzuzu, 
Arthur Maramba, Christopher Chatambudza, Simon C. Nyandoro, Godfrey Manyerenyere, 
Godwin Dube, and Chubby Savanhu were overcome after running out of ammunition, but 
not before they had downed a Rhodesian helicopter and killed twenty-five soldiers. It is 
known today as the Chinhoyi Battle. A secondary school built next to the battle scene in 
1986 has been appropriately named Chemagamba—The Heroes’ Place. See Farirai 
Machivenyika, Chinhoyi Seven Declared National Heroes, THE CHRONICLE (July 31, 2017, 
2:07 PM), https://www.chronicle.co.zw/chinhoyi-7-declared-national-heroes/. 
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arbitrarily impose family dynasty governance on Zimbabwe. Placards13 
displayed at the demonstrations against Mugabe during the operation, 
particularly on November 18, left no doubt about what Operation 
Restore Legacy was all about—namely, the outright and resounding 
rejection of arbitrary rule. One placard read, “No to Mugabe Dynasty.” 
Another read, “Leadership is Not Sexually Transmitted.” Yet another 
read, “SADC and AU stay out of our affairs. This is what we want as 
Zimbabwe. Mugabe Out!!!” 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) leadership 
responded swiftly and vociferously to Operation Restore Legacy in the 
name of SADC and Zimbabwean constitutionalism, which came as no 
surprise. As one of the architects of SADC constitutionalism from the 
outset, and also as the longest-serving African head of state and 
government, Mr. Mugabe had mentored each SADC head of state and 
government both individually and collectively in the Assembly of 
States Parties of both the SADC and the African Union (A.U.). In a 
sense, Operation Restore Legacy became an unexpected but severe test 
of the SADC leadership’s loyalty to their “master and mentor” Mugabe. 
In a 2018 interview,14 Mugabe boldly stated that his mentees all 
failed him. He singled out South Africa for special criticism because of 
its military strength in comparison to other SADC states. He stated that 
the South African defense and security ministers dispatched on 
November 15 to Harare by former President Zuma “gave a false 
impression that all was okay [and that] they had spoken not just to us 
but also to the soldiers, and then gave out that there was no need for 
intervention.”15 For this reason, other countries in the region “just sat 
on their laurels and they said: Ah[,] well[,] South Africa says there’s 
no need [to intervene].”16 
13 See Image Results, Google Images, https://www.google.com/imghp?hl=en (search 
“Operation Restore Legacy”), https://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=en&biw=1536&bih= 
872&tbm=isch&sa=1&ei=g_g5W9OAH8rYgAb5s5f4Dw&q=grace+mugabe%2C+leaders
hip+is+not+sexually+transmitted&oq=grace+mugabe%2C+leadership+is+not+sexually+tr
ansmitted&gs_l=img.12. . .18779.21754.0.24197.12.12.0.0.0.0.93.591.12.12.0. . ..0. . .1c.1
.64.img..0.0.0. . ..0.GsQelvYy62Q. 
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I 
THE PROBLEM: AFRICAN STATES EMBRACE 
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
ESTABLISH REGIONAL ENTITIES FOR GOVERNANCE 
African states appear to have embraced constitutionalization17 of 
international law and established regional and subregional inter-
governmental entities for ensuring deeper economic integration among 
themselves, human rights protection, and the rule of law. These 
intergovernmental entities and institutions must be evaluated for their 
potential to achieve their declared goals,18 which they often fall short 
of doing. This raises serious questions about their legitimacy.19 One 
such institution, the SADC, was established by treaty in 1992 to 
promote regional integration, including economic development and 
ensuring peace and security.20 However, enormous constitutional law 
issues were raised consequent upon Zimbabwe’s membership in the 
SADC during Operation Restore Legacy. 
A. SADC Treaty
Zimbabwe is a founding member state of the organization that has a 
wide range of objectives, including ensuring peace and security in the 
subregion. Chapter VIII of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter is the 
constitutional basis for the involvement of regional organizations and 
agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security.21 
Consequently, Zimbabwe has peace and security obligations under the 
SADC Treaty. 
17 See RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009); Armin von Bogdandy, 
Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from Germany, 47 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 223 (2006); Christine E.J. Schwöbel, Situating the Debate on Global 
Constitutionalism, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 611 (2010). 
18 See Moritz Baumgärtel et al., Hierarchy, Coordination, or Conflict? Global Law 
Theories and the Question of Human Rights Integration, EUR. J. HUM. RTS., no. 3, 2014, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277710817_Hierarchy_Coordination_or_ 
Conflict_Global_Law_Theories_and_the_Question_of_Human_Rights. 
19 See Ben Chigara, What Should a Re-constituted Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Tribunal be Mindful of to Succeed, 81 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 341 (2012). 
20 See Consolidated Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, Oct. 21, 
2015.  
21 See Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Regional Arrangements 
(Chapter VIII), http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/regional_arrangements.shtml. 
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Briefly, Article 52 of the U.N. Charter provides for the involvement 
of regional arrangements or agencies in the peaceful settlement of 
disputes.22 Article 53 allows regional institutions to take enforcement 
action, but only with explicit authorization of the Security Council. 
Article 54 requires regional institutions or agencies taking peace and 
security initiatives to inform the Security Council of their activities at 
all times.23 Thus, as long as it complies with these requirements, the 
SADC remains suited as the first responder to SADC peace and 
security challenges until the African Union or the U.N. Security 
Council intervenes.24 
1. On the Absolute Prohibition of Unconstitutional Takeover of Power
SADC peace and security initiatives have been extensively
developed and codified. They encompass ongoing interstate police and 
military training for peace and security enforcement operations. The 
SADC norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional takeover 
of power has been codified in various SADC instruments and 
consolidated under the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO), which was revised 
at Maputo on August 5, 2010.25 SIPO is itself a mechanism for the 
implementation of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation, which was revised at Blantyre on August 14, 2001 
(Blantyre Protocol).26 
The Blantyre Protocol seeks to implement the overarching SADC 
objectives contained in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty.27 The norm on 
22 See U.N. Charter art. 52, 1 UNTS xvi. 
23 Id. at art. 53. 
24 Michael Barnett, Partners in Peace? The UN, Regional Organizations, and Peace-
Keeping, 21 (4) REV. OF INT’L STUDIES 411–33 (Oct. 1995); UN Security Council Report, 
Cooperation between the UN and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a peacekeeping 




25 Southern African Development Community [SADC], Strategic Indicative Plan for the 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (rev. ed. Aug. 5, 2010), http://www. 
sadc.int/files/6313/6880/3040/03514_SADC_SIPO_English.pdf [hereinafter SIPO]. 
26 Southern African Development Community [SADC], Protocol on Politics, Defence 
and Security Co-operation (Aug. 14, 2001), http://www.sadc.int/files/3613/5292/8367/ 
Protocol_on_Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf [hereinafter Blantyre Protocol]. 
27 Southern African Development Community [SADC], Treaty of the Southern African 
Development Community, (Aug. 17, 1992), http://www.sadc.int/files/9113/5292/9434/ 
SADC_Treaty.pdf; see also Southern African Development Community [SADC], Regional 
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the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power is the 
centerpiece of the SADC’s peace and security apparatus. However, the 
United Nations has made human rights protection its core value for 
promoting and protecting international peace and security.28  
Thus, the SADC leadership’s insistence on the primacy and 
constitutional supremacy of the norm on the prohibition of 
unconstitutional takeover of power absent the guarantee of impeccable 
national assembly election outcomes is the biggest, most unmistakable 
contradiction of present times. Zimbabwe is not even a State party to 
the African Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance.29 
Zimbabwe has yet to even place its signature on that treaty.  
Yet, one of the core achievements of Mugabe’s thirty-seven years 
and seven months in power is the entrenchment of the absolute 
prohibition against unconstitutional takeover of power in the 
constitutional law of the SADC. Why did Mugabe invest so much effort 
into such a project and neglect institutionalizing the requirement for 
dependable national assembly ballots?  
Under the norm established, it is illegal to mount a coup d’état. 
Perpetrators face political oblivion. This has become a constitutional 
norm of extreme importance for both the SADC and the African Union. 
The Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol)30 
recognizes the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights (ACJHR) over fourteen international and transnational crimes, 
including an unconstitutional takeover of power.31 Article 28E (1)(a-f) 
defines the crime of unconstitutional change of government as 
“committing or ordering to be committed the following acts, with the 
Indicative Strategic Development Plan, http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/ 
Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf. 
28 See U.N. Charter art. 1 (Preamble). 
29 See African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, African Union, date 
of adoption Jan. 30, 2007 (entered into force Feb. 15, 2012).  
30 See Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights, at art. 28E, African Union (June 27, 2014), https://au.int/web/ 
sites/default/files/treaties/7804-treaty-0045_-_protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_ 
on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e.pdf; see also Abass, 
supra note 1; Kemp & Kinyunyu, supra note 1.  
31 Id. Other crimes under the jurisdiction of the ACJHR include genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, the crime of unconstitutional change of government, piracy, 
terrorism, mercenarism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in 
drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit exploitation of natural resources, and the crime 
of aggression. 
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aim of illegally accessing or maintaining power” and lists the 
following:  
a) A putsch or coup d’état against a democratically elected
government;
b) An intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically
elected government;
c) Any replacement of a democratically elected government by the
use of armed dissidents or rebels or through political
assassination;
d) Any refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to
the winning party or candidate after free, fair and regular
elections;
e) Any amendment or revision of the Constitution or legal
instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of
democratic change of government or is inconsistent with the
Constitution;
f) Any substantial modification to the electoral laws in the last six
(6) months before the elections without the consent of the majority
of the political actors.32
Institutions for ensuring the absolute prohibition of the 
unconstitutional takeover of power have already been elaborately 
developed by the SADC. The SADC’s Strategic Indicative Plan for the 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SIPO)33 and the 
African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC)34 are both robust 
and reliable mechanisms that African leaders now look to for 
restoration of power in the event of a revolution. This fierce assault by 
African leadership, and by the SADC leadership in particular, against 
citizens’ authority to decline and recall governments is one-sided. It is 
not matched by an equal and necessary absolute guarantee of safe, 
reliable, and dependable national assembly ballots to determine who 
legitimately governs these states, as required under Article 25 of the 
U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).35 
The prohibition of the unconstitutional takeover of power is brazenly 
championed under the guise of peace, security, and political stability.  
32 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights, supra note 30. 
33 SIPO, supra note 25. 
34 See Peace and Security Council (PSC), AFRICAN UNION, https://au.int/en/organs/psc 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2018). 
35 G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), at 49 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
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Yet SADC countries’ recent history on the question of the 
dependability of their national assembly ballots as an authentic process 
for ensuring that citizens decide who governs over them is far from 
encouraging. Electoral fraud is one of the most complained about 
problems in the discourse on combatting corruption and ensuring good 
governance in the SADC.36 This is an anomaly that requires urgent 
correction if the SADC wishes to insist on the primacy and supremacy 
of the constitutional norm on the absolute prohibition of 
unconstitutional takeover of power, and also if it wishes to enhance its 
uptake of foreign direct investment. As a precondition to enforcement 
of the former norm, a new constitutional normative structure of equal 
weight to the one on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional 
takeover of power must be developed and enforced, targeting the 
requirement of absolute transparency and dependability of the national 
assembly ballot.37 
Operation Restore Legacy had to overcome the SADC trap against 
any military takeover of power in the subregion to succeed in restoring 
citizen choice in Zimbabwe.  
2. ZDF and the Absolute Prohibition of Unconstitutional Takeover of
Power
In light of the norms present and endorsed by the SADC, from the
beginning of its intervention, the ZDF engaged the media and 
unambiguously and meticulously communicated that Operation 
Restore Legacy was not a coup d’état. Consequently, it could not be 
perceived as a breach of any strictures of constitutional law of 
Zimbabwe, the SADC, or the African Union. Throughout Operation 
Restore Legacy, the ZDF deliberately referred to Mr. Mugabe as 
commander in chief and as the president of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 
even though they had placed him under house arrest. The ZDF let 
Mugabe have international calls with other SADC leaders. He was even 
able to perform his ceremonial duties as Chancellor of the Open 
University of Zimbabwe and to give a televised address to the nation. 
36 Khabele Matlosa, Survey of Electoral Systems and Reform Imperatives in the SADC 
Region, THE ELECTORAL INST. OF S. AFR., (Sept. 2003), https://www.researchgate.net/ 
publication/228435353_Survey_of_Electoral_Sytems_and_Reform_Imperatives_in_the_ 
SADC_Region. 
37 See Nobert Kersting, Electoral Reform in Southern Africa: Voter Turnout, Electoral 
Rules and Infrastructure, 6 J. AFR. ELECTIONS 134–51 (2007).  
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This was followed by an immediate line-up of the service chiefs who 
each saluted the president publicly on live national television broadcast 
at the end of the address where he had been expected to resign the 
presidency and pave the way for a new leader but had not done so.38 
The ZDF even established negotiation teams comprising South 
African and Zambian envoys to help resolve the political conundrum. 
For ten days, the ZDF tried to persuade Mr. Mugabe to resign from the 
Presidency of Zimbabwe. Perhaps mindful of the unemployment 
statistics, which showed a national unemployment figure of ninety-five 
percent, Mr. Mugabe repeatedly scorned that request. All these facts 
combined to give Operation Restore Legacy the appearance of anything 
but a coup d’état.  
These calculations on the part of the ZDF, coupled with its persistent 
and unambiguous protestations that Operation Restore Legacy was not 
in any way a coup d’état, appeared to confuse and freeze the hand of 
the SADC leadership from triggering the SADC constitutional norm on 
the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power.39  
3. International Reporting on Operation Restore Legacy
International media, used to understanding and reporting situations
in clear terms, was baffled by the unfolding military intervention. 
Although Operation Restore Legacy had been triggered by the ZDF, it 
immediately attracted the spontaneous, voluntary, and universal 
support of all Zimbabweans. The citizens fanned the operation’s power 
fervently and unrelentingly from literally every part of the country. 
This sui generis operation compelled western media to introduce new 
vocabulary—namely, a coup-that-wasn’t-a-coup40—as the best way to 
characterize Operation Restore Legacy. In this light, it appears more 
appropriate to describe the operation as a measure to correct 
Zimbabwe’s governance destiny from the Mugabe’s contrived family 
dynasty rule to, hopefully, people’s sovereignty, which early signs 
suggest is the case.  
38 See Robert Mugabe Stuns Zimbabwe by Failing to Quit—As it Happened, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2017, 4:55 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/nov/ 
19/robert-mugabe-set-to-resign-as-president-of-zimbabwe-live. 
39 See Chigara, supra note 19, at 341. 
40 See Eliza Mackintosh, Is Zimbabwe’s Military Takeover the World’s Strangest (non) 
Coup?, CNN (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/20/africa/zimbabwe-military-
takeover-strangest-coup/index.html. 
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II 
SADC PRACTICE RE THE NORM ON THE ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION 
OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKEOVER OF POWER 
The SADC has consistently upheld its norm on the absolute 
prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power since its 
inauguration. Previous to Operation Restore Legacy, the SADC 
condemned unconstitutional takeover of power in Madagascar, 
Lesotho, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
A. Madagascar (2010)
By its Double Troika Summit Communique41 of January 14, 2010, 
the SADC reiterated its decision to suspend Madagascar from all 
SADC organs, structures, and institutions until the restoration of 
constitutional order in that country. It called upon the African Union, 
the United Nations, and other international organizations and 
institutions to apply the same measure.  
The Troika rejected “any attempt to use democratic means, 
institutions and processes to legitimize Governments that came to 
power through unconstitutional means, and urges the international 
community, in particular the development partners, to support SADC’s 
efforts to promote and sustain democracy in the region in general and 
Madagascar in particular.”42 
Further, the SADC Summit also rejected the unilateral plan of Andry 
Rajoelina’s de facto Government of Madagascar to reorganize the 
transition and hold legislative elections in March 2010, after his 
overthrow of President Ravalomanana. The SADC urged the 
international community to reject and penalize the new regime. The 
African Union immediately imposed targeted sanctions against Mr. 
Rajoelina and his administration. The European Union suspended 
development aid to Madagascar by adoption of what it called 
“appropriate measures”43 of the European Council, based on Article 96 
41 Double Troika Summit Communique, Southern African Development Community 
[SADC] (Jan. 14, 2010), https://www.sadc.int/files/9213/5292/8385/Double_TROIka_ 
Summit_Communique-Jan2010.pdf. 
42 Id. 
43 See Madagascar, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ 
countries/madagascar_en.  
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of the Cotonou Agreement,44 which refers to partner states’ approaches 
to human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law. The 
measures entailed the suspension of the 10th European Development 
Fund Country Strategy Paper as well as all cooperation projects 
implemented through the government.45 
This was not the first time that the SADC had intervened to stop an 
attempted unconstitutional takeover of power. President Nelson 
Mandela’s government had invoked the SADC Organ for Conflict 
Prevention46 in 1998 to put down a civilian-backed military coup in 
Lesotho. 
B. Lesotho (1998)
Pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security in the Southern African Development Community Region,47 
Pakalitha Mosisili, Prime Minister of Lesotho on September 16, 1998, 
requested that South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique rescue to his 
government from a couple.48 Article 5(1) of the Protocol49 provides that 
a member State can request the Organ to convene in order to bring the 
existence or imminent threat of a conflict to its attention, at any time.50 
The South African government obliged by sending a dawn advance 
party of 600 troops, later joined by 250 from nearby Botswana, armored 
44 Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and its Member States, of 
the Other Part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, 15.12.2000 OFF. J. EUR. UNION L. 317/3 
(June 23, 2000), https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/partnership-agreement-between-members-
african-caribbean-and-pacific-group-states-one-part-and_en.  
45 Double Troika Summit Communique, supra note 41. 
46 “The Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (Organ) was launched in June 1996 as 
a formal institution of SADC with the mandate to support the achievement and maintenance 
of security and the rule of law in the SADC region.” Southern African Development 
Community [SADC], Organ on Politics, Defense and Security, TOWARDS A COMMON 
FUTURE, http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/directorates/office-executive-secretary/organ 
-politics-defense-and-security/.
47 Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security in the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) Region, 11 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L., 197, 200 (1999) [hereinafter The
Protocol].
48 P. Hawthorne, The Battle for Lesotho, 152 TIME 39 (Oct. 5, 1998). 
49 Fako Johnson Likoti, The 1998 Military Intervention in Lesotho: SADC Peace 
Mission or Resource War?, 14 J. INT’L PEACEKEEPING 251 (2007), https://www.tandf 
online.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13533310601150875?needAccess=true.  
50 Id. 
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cars, helicopters, gunships, and tanks. This appeared to be entirely 
consistent with Article 5(2)51 of the Protocol. 
South Africa’s intervention ended with violence, including 30 dead 
at the end of the first day. The facts leading to the SADC force’s 
intervention raise issues that the SADC Protocol never addresses, 
including the guarantee to individuals’ right to democratic 
governance,52 the right to self-determination,53 and individuals’ peace 
and security.  
Neither President Mandela nor Security Minister Mufamadi had 
considered the sovereign right of the Sotho people to democratic 
governance under Article 25 of the ICCPR or exercise of their right to 
self-determination as paramount. The sole concern of the president and 
his security minister was the prevention of anarchy and chaos, which 
they had only guessed might follow (there was no guarantee of their 
forecast coming to fruition) in the little kingdom of 2.23 million people. 
People were killed by the intervention and not before the intervention. 
As pleaded by the requesting authorities, the object of the intervention 
was to rescue the authorities and maintain them as the rulers. This 
would deny the people of Lesotho all the rights that Mr. Mandela had 
previously stated that he had been prepared to die for. 
The intervention by the Lesotho defense forces followed seven 
weeks of “unrest caused by allegations of fraud during general 
elections in May. . . . The opposition complained that May’s general 
election, which gave the ruling Congress for Democracy 79 out of 80 
seats, was rigged.”54 
C. Democratic Republic of Congo (1998)
Previous to Operation Restore Legacy, the SADC intervened in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. On August 2, 1998, a rebellion 
occurred against President Kabila of the Democratic Republic of 
51 “In the case of intra-State conflicts, the Organ shall respond to an invitation by a 
member country to become involved in mediating a conflict within its borders.” The 
Protocol, supra note 47.  
52 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L., 46–91 (Jan. 1992). 
53 See G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 66 (Dec. 14, 1960); HURST HANNUM, Legal Aspects of 
Self-determination, in THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SELF DETERMINATION, 
https://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/254. 
54 World: Africa “Shoot to Kill” in Lesotho, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/africa/178605.stm (Sept. 23, 1998, 11:26 PM). 
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Congo. Pursuant to the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security in 
the SADC Region55 a commission was established on August 8, 1998, 
in Harare to try and broker a peaceful settlement among the warring 
parties. The Commission comprised the foreign ministers of 
Zimbabwe,56 Zambia, Namibia, and Angola. On August 18, the 
Commission met in Goma with rebel and civilian leaders in an effort 
to determine first, whether Rwanda and Uganda had violated Congo’s 
borders and second, what help, if any, the rebels were receiving.57 This 
gathering followed earlier meetings with Ugandan officials, Rwandese 
officials, and President Kabila in Kinshasa.58 On August 19, the 
Commission reported its findings. Zimbabwe’s Defense Minister 
Moven Mahachi announced, “It was unanimously agreed that we must 
with urgency make sure practical assistance, both material and 
manpower, is given to (Congo) in order to restore peace and 
stability.”59  
The foregoing illustrations show that SADC leadership is ever so 
keen to implement the norm on the absolute prohibition of 
unconstitutional takeover of power. Enjoyment of that power must 
presuppose a sound human rights record on behalf of SADC 
governments. However, international monitoring organizations’ 
periodic reports on human rights and democracy are less than flattering 
for this region.60  
55 The Protocol, supra note 47, at 197. 
56 As Chairman of the proposed Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in the Region, 
and in response to President Kabila’s request for help, Zimbabwe convened the meeting as 
required under Articles 5(1) and 5(2)(2) of the Protocol. Article 5(1) provides that “[a]ny 
member State can at any time request the Organ to convene in order to bring the existence 
or imminent threat of a conflict to its attention, in which case the Organ would be convened 
expeditiously.” Id. at 200; Article 5(2)(2) provides that “[i]n the case of intra-State conflicts, 
the Organ shall respond to an invitation by a member country to become involved in 
mediating a conflict within its borders.” Id. Article 5(2)(1) states that “Intra-State conflicts 
which could be subjected to regional intervention include: (a) large-scale violence between 
sections of the population of a State, or between the State and/or its armed or para-military 
forces and sections of the population; (b) a threat to the legitimate authority of the 
government (such as a military coup by the armed or para-military forces).” Id. 
57 Stan Mudenge, Zimbabwe’s Foreign Minister, is quoted as having stated, “We’re here 
to find out whether this is an invasion or an internal invasion.” Ian Stewart, Kabila’s Grasp 
Slipping, ABC NEWS (Aug. 19, 1998), http://archive.abcnews.com/world/DailyNews/ 
Congo980818.html. 
58 Id. 
59 DRC: Zimbabwe Says SADC to Back Kabila, (Aug. 19, 1998), https://reliefweb. 
int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-zimbabwe-says-sadc-back-kabila. 
60 See, e.g., Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2016, 97–
172 (2016), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/annual_report_on_human_rights_and 
_democracy_in_the_world_2016_0.pdf. 
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The E.U. Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the 
World states that with regard to Angola, “In 2016 the human rights 
situation was characterized by shrinking political space ahead of 
parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for August 2017.”61 
Regarding Lesotho, where President Mandela’s government had 
intervened in 1998, the report points to political instability, which 
affected the rule of law and undermined the work of oversight 
institutions.62 The situation was no better in Madagascar, where the 
SADC had intervened in 2010, citing crime and corruption for 
weighing “heavily on the respect for human rights. Police violence as 
well as public lynching happens frequently.”63 
Zambia is cited for “constrains regarding the implantation of 
legislation and policies in the area of human rights and democracy.”64 
President Mugabe’s Zimbabwe is reported to be characterized by police 
brutality against opposition party political rallies, including those 
previously sanctioned by the courts, intimidation and jailing of 
hundreds of protesters without due process, and documented cases of 
abduction and torture of social movement participants and their 
families.65  
Yet, a social contract between the governed and their leaders is 
implicit in the norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional 
takeover of power. Otherwise, it would not make sense at all in light of 
the emergent human rights culture espoused by the United Nations.  
III 
SUPPOSITION OF GOOD GOVERNANCE IMPLIED BY THE SADC 
NORM ON THE ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
TAKEOVER OF POWER 
The SADC norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional 
takeover of power compels a deeper inquiry into the question of 
whether SADC governments have the human rights credentials that 
merit possession and application of such a power. An impeccable 
human rights qualifying record could be established by SADC member 
states if each could demonstrate the following as a minimum: (1) 
61 Id. at 97. 
62 Id. at 133. 
63 Id. at 136. 
64 Id. at 168. 
65 Id. at 170. 
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participation in at least fifteen of the current stock of eighteen 
international human rights instruments; (2)  participation in all nine 
current human rights treaty monitoring bodies and recognition of 
individuals’ rights to petition/communicate any alleged human rights 
breaches to the appropriate treaty monitoring body; (3)  establishment 
of a National Human Rights Committee with powers and means to 
expeditiously process human rights claims within the state; (4) 
demonstration of a clear record of holding verifiable free and fair 
national assembly elections. 
Additionally, to insist on benefiting from the SADC norm on the 
absolute prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power, SADC 
states must continually demonstrate adherence to the good governance 
criteria of the United Nations.  
A. International Requirement to Recognize, Promote, and Protect
Good Governance 
The U.N. Office of the High Commission of Human Rights 
(OHCHR) writes that good governance encompasses 
full respect of human rights, the rule of law, effective participation, 
multi-actor partnerships, political pluralism, transparent and 
accountable processes and institutions, an efficient and effective 
public sector, legitimacy, access to knowledge, information and 
education, political empowerment of people, equity, sustainability, 
and attitudes and values that foster responsibility, solidarity and 
tolerance. 
 [It] . . . relates to political and institutional processes and outcomes 
that are deemed necessary to achieve the goals of development. . . . 
good governance is the process whereby public institutions conduct 
public affairs, manage public resources and guarantee the realization 
of human rights in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, 
and with due regard for the rule of law. The true test of “good” 
governance is the degree to which it delivers on the promise of human 
rights: civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.66 
In Resolution 2000/64, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights67 
identified transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, 
and responsiveness to the needs of the people as the key performance 
indicators of good governance. 
66 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Good Governance and Human 
Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/Good 
GovernanceIndex.aspx. 
67 U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2000/64 (Apr. 26, 2000). 
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In Zimbabwe, the ZDF spokesperson stated that Operation Restore 
Legacy had evidently been motivated by criminality of those closely 
linked to Mr. Mugabe, both inside and outside the government. Mr. 
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe seemed to be a state far removed from the good 
governance standards of the United Nations, with no hope of recovery. 
National unemployment was at ninety-five percent and corruption 
appeared to reign everywhere.68  
B. SADC Lip Service to Democratic Governance?
Democratic governance is habitually referenced in regional human 
rights documents that are pertinent to Zimbabwe. They include the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union,69 the Lomé Declaration on 
Unconstitutional Changes of Government,70 and the African Charter on 
Democracy Elections and Governance (ACDEG). The ACDEG, 
adopted on January 30, 2007,71 is a holistic treaty that targets the 
entrenchment of democracy, human rights, and good governance. It 
focuses on credible elections, the promotion of human rights, the rule 
of law, the improvement of political, economic, and social governance, 
and challenging all recurrent issues relating to unconstitutional changes 
of government among African states.72 
Article 48 of the ACDEG required only fifteen ratifications out of 
fifty-five possible states to bring it into force.73 However, it took a full 
five years, one month, and two weeks to bring it into force. The Charter 
has since been ratified by thirty states and signed by forty-five states.74 
This hardly inspires confidence in the continent’s attitude toward the 
implementation of free and fair elections as a means to enhancing good 
governance among African states. 
68 See Mpazi Sinjela, The African Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption, in THE AFRICAN UNION: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, A 
MANUAL ON THE PAN-AFRICAN ORGANIZATION 291, 291–301 (2012).  
69 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Organization of African Unity, May 26, 2001, 
2158 U.N.T.S. 3. 
70 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Lome Declaration of July 2000 
on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, U.N. 
Doc. AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) (July 12, 2000).  
71 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, African Union (Jan. 30, 
2007), https://au. int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance.  
72 See id. 
73 Id. at art. 48. 
74 Chike Charles Aniekwe et al., The 10th Anniversary of the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance, INST. OF DEV. POLICY (2017), 
http://cris.unu.edu/10th-anniversary-african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance. 
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Ominously, Zimbabwe has neither signed nor ratified the ACDEG. 
Yet, Mr. Mugabe was a champion for installation and recognition of 
the prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power in the SADC and 
beyond. His wariness of the idea of democratic governance was 
matched only by his determination to stop others from assuming power 
undemocratically. 
C. The SADC Norm: A Blunt Tool to Counter Good Governance
As presently constituted and implemented, the SADC constitutional
norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power 
appears to be a blunt tool of the ruling elite to counter good governance 
in order to subjugate SADC populations. The SADC leadership 
upholds the prohibition regardless of any protestations from frustrated, 
affected populations. There are no exceptions to this norm. Yet, the 
virtue it presumes of political leadership in SADC states is hard to find 
in the majority of cases.  
For instance, only three of the fifteen SADC member states have 
ratified the U.N. Convention for the Protection of all Persons from 
Enforced Disappearances (CPED).75 This convention could be 
described as the litmus test of good governance. Yet, only one-fifth of 
SADC states are parties to it. 
Article 2 of the CPED defines enforced disappearance as 
the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of 
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons 
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, 
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by 
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, 
which place such a person outside the protection of the law.76 
The Convention has a treaty body for monitoring a state’s 
compliance with its obligations which include, inter alia, the 
requirements to (1) enact specific laws establishing the crime of 
enforced disappearance; (2) investigate complaints and reports of 
enforced disappearance and bring those responsible to justice; (3) 
prevent the menace by detaining persons only in officially approved 
and monitored institutions in which all prisoners are registered, ensure 
the absolute right to Habeas corpus (a legal action, through which a 
75 See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, entered into force Dec. 23, 2010, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3. (Lesotho, Dec. 6, 2013; 
Malawi, July 14, 2017; and Zambia, Apr. 4, 2011), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/View 
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-16&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter CPED]. 
76 Id. 
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prisoner can be released from unlawful detention, that is, detention 
lacking sufficient cause or evidence); (4) prevent concealment of the 
whereabouts of arrested persons so that no one finds themselves placed 
outside the protection of the law; (5) observe the right of victims and 
their families to know the truth regarding the circumstances and fate of 
the disappeared person; (6) criminalize the unlawful abduction of 
children whose parents were victims of enforced disappearance as well 
as the faking of these children’s identities and their adoption.77 
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe has been cited persistently in the work of the 
monitoring body—the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances. For instance, in its report on December 21, 2009,78 the 
Working Group requested investigatory visits to Zimbabwe following 
reports of Mugabe’s failure to protect people from disappearances.79  
It is curious that SADC states are reluctant to participate in this good 
governance test convention. This is in stark contrast to the respective 
governments’ unashamed championing and establishment of robust 
subregional and regional regimes and mechanisms for insulating one 
another from public rejection of their oppression.  
Until the very end of Operation Restore Legacy, Mugabe appeared 
to exude confidence that the sophisticated ZDF action would suffer 
delegitimation by both the SADC and the African Union, which he had 
nurtured to react only one way in such circumstances. He had also 
given them the legal norm to justify putting down “unconstitutional 
power takeovers.” 
This norm is referenced directly and indirectly throughout the 
Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security Cooperation.80 It is explicitly codified in paragraph 1.2.8, 
which states “though there is relative peace and stability in the region, 
there are challenges in the form of climate change, economic recession, 
unconstitutional change of governments, the growing vulnerability of 
national borders . . .” (emphasis added).81  
The treaty obsesses over protection against unconstitutional 
takeover of power without linking or coupling it with the requirement 
77 See id. 
78 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on 
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, U.N. Doc A/HRC/13/31 (Dec. 21, 2009). 
79 Id.  
80 SIPO, supra note 25. 
81 Id. at ¶ 1.2.8. 
194 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 20, 173 
for governments to commit to recognizing, promoting, and protecting 
the human rights of their populations. In paragraph 5.2, the treaty 
powers are justified by the claim that “subversion of the constitutional 
order and national sovereignty” are a major challenge for SADC 
governments.82 
Mr. Edgar Lungu, the Zambian President and SADC leader most 
astute regarding the virtues of the norm on the absolute prohibition of 
unconstitutional takeover of power, was the first to swing into action 
by declaring. Local media outlets further reported Lungu stating that 
his troops were ready to support and uphold Mugabe’s regime.83  
Lungu’s behavior is a perfect fit for political unawareness, 
noticeably because Zimbabweans of all persuasions, backgrounds, and 
political affiliations unanimously endorsed the ZDF intervention. 
Zimbabweans instantaneously and spontaneously flooded the streets 
across the country, and any form of social media accessible to them, to 
implore the SADC and the African Union not to meddle in their affairs. 
There were tweets and retweets with the hashtag, 
“#SADCBackOffZim,” and others declaring, “There is a special place 
in hell for anyone—SADC, Zuma, AU—that tries to get between a 
scorned dictator and his people. Zimbabwe has been cheated of real 
change before; it can’t be allowed to happen again.”84 
Such a radical confirmation of the democratic entitlement approach 
to national governmental legitimacy is mandatory to secure the 
inalienable rights of citizens. Its demand has probably not been so 
vigorously expressed for a very long time in Zimbabwe’s modern 
history.85 Democratic entitlement theory insists that governments 
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. For this 
reason, Edgar Lungu’s remarks raise significant concerns about the 
object, purpose, and utility of SADC values to SADC citizens under 
modern international law, which has realigned sovereignty claims to 
82 Id. at ¶ 5.2. 
83 Wilbert Mukori, Zambian Army to Invade Zimbabwe to Help Mugabe: Lungu, Keep 
Your Nose Out of Zimbabwe Affairs, BULAWAYO24 NEWS, (Nov. 16, 2007, 6:43 PM), 
http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-122178.html. 
84 Liesel Louw-Vaudran, The Zimbabwe Dilemma Illustrated the Weaknesses of the 
Organisation’s Governance Instruments, INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES (Nov. 22, 
2017), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-african-unions-chequered-history-with-military-
coups. 
85 See Franck, supra note 52. 
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human security concerns instead of the previous state security 
concerns.86  
Lungu’s remarks also contradict Zimbabwe’s enduring ancient 
convention manifested by Operation Restore Legacy: chava-
Chimurenga/sesi-Inkululekho/time to resist oppression. The remarks 
pit people’s sovereignty against protectionism of the ruling elite. Those 
who remained in support of Mugabe were of the elite, such as South 
African President Jacob Zuma, who is reported to have telephoned 
Mugabe during Mugabe’s house arrest and soon afterwards dispatched 
his security chiefs to meet with Mugabe in Harare.87 
IV 
HUMAN RIGHTS DISINCLINATIONS OF SADC MEMBER STATES 
AND KELSEN’S THEORIES ON THE GRUNDNORM 
Human security is assured when governments subject themselves 
inter alia to external monitoring of their human rights practices— 
something that SADC states appear loath to do. There are nine 
international human rights treaties and nine optional human rights 
protocols, bringing the total number of international human rights 
instruments to eighteen.88 SADC states’ participation in these 
instruments is worryingly low, particularly their participation in treaty 
bodies that monitor member states’ compliance with their obligations 
under each corresponding treaty.  
86 See U.N. TR. FUND FOR HUM. SEC., http://www.un.org/humansecurity/human-
security-unit/human-security-approach; U.N. TR. FUND FOR HUM. SEC., http://www. 
un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/human_security_in_theory_a
nd_practice_english.pdf; see also Ben Chigara, The ILO, Harbinger and Chief Protagonist 
for the Recognition and Promotion of the Inherent Dignity of Sub-Saharan Africa Labour, 
in PROTECTING HUMAN SECURITY IN AFRICA 274–77 (OXFORD U. PRESS 2010); S. NEIL 
MACFARLANE & YUEN FOONG KHONG, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE UN: A CRITICAL 
HISTORY (Ind. U. Press 2006); Alex J. Bellamy & Matt McDonald, “The Utility of Human 
Security”: Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas and Tow, 33(3) SEC. 
DIALOGUE 373, 373–77 (2002). 
87 #Zimbabwe: Zuma Says Mugabe Under House Arrest but Is “Fine,” IOL (Nov. 15, 
2017, 12:41 PM), https://www.iol.co.za/news/special-features/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-zuma-
says-mugabe-under-house-arrest-but-is-fine-12010473; see also Zimbabwe’s Mugabe Told 
Zuma He Was Confined to Home but Fine: S. African Presidency, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2017, 
2:48 AM), https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1DF1EF-OZATP. 
88 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Core International Human 
Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2017).  
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There is a universal constitution for the recognition, promotion, and 
protection of the inherent dignity of citizens called the International 
Bill of Human Rights.89 SADC states’ circumvention of this 
constitution, coupled with its lip service to the recognition, promotion, 
and protection of the inherent dignity of individuals on their territories, 
contrasts sharply with their zeal to insist that citizens can use only 
national assembly ballots to change leadership. But national assembly 
ballots do not have a very good record of registering the people’s 
choice of leadership in many of these states. The failure of national 
assembly ballots alone undermines the SADC leadership’s concern 
about being removed from office by their populations. In fact, elections 
are the least likely way of doing that because of the ruthlessly efficient 
electoral fraud practices in the African subregion. 
A. SADC’s Ratifications of the Current Stock of Eighteen
International Human Rights Instruments 
Figure 1 and Table 1 on the following pages illustrate SADC 
countries’ participation in various human rights measures. Figure 1 
shows that, of the eighteen international human rights instruments, no 
SADC state has ratified fifteen to eighteen instruments. Moreover, only 
two-thirds of the SADC states have ratified ten to fourteen instruments; 
those states include Madagascar, Seychelles, Mozambique, South 
Africa, Namibia, Angola, Malawi, Tanzania, Lesotho, and Swaziland. 
Also, three SADC states—Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana—have 
ratified a mere five to nine of the human rights instruments available.  
89 Refers to the norms contained in five U.N. treaties for the advancement of 
fundamental freedoms and protection of basic human rights of all people: Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1966); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)— 
(ICCPR); Optional Protocol to the ICCPR; and Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR on 
the abolition of the Death Penalty. 
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Figure 1. Standing of SADC in Comparison to World Regions 
Category 1: 15–18; Category 2: 10–14; Category 3: 5–9; Category 4: 0–4 
Source: United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.90 
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90 See Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2018). 
91 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
adopted Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1969). 
92 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
93 G.A. Res. 63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008). 
94 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
95 See Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, 
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER (Aug. 20, 2018), http://indicators.ohchr.org (select 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in the Select a Treaty drop-down box). 
96 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, supra note 94.  
97 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
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During Mugabe’s thirty-seven year rule of Zimbabwe, the country 
showed very little appetite to subscribe to international human rights 
procedures that allow individuals to submit claims to human rights 
treaty monitoring bodies.98 In the post-Mugabe era, Zimbabwe must 
make haste to do more to achieve a pro–human rights democratic status. 
It should distance itself away from the SADC norm on the absolute 
prohibition against unconstitutional takeover of power until a parallel 
regime of similar weight requiring sanctity of national assembly ballots 
has been established as a constitutional norm of the SADC. In any 
event, Zambia, Angola, and South Africa’s insistence that Zimbabwe’s 
Operation Restore Legacy fell under SADC norm99 is symptomatic of 
the decrepit values of the SADC and a mockery of logic because (1) in 
his November 21, 2017, notice to the Speaker of Parliament Jacob 
Mudenda, Mugabe made it clear that he had voluntarily reached the 
decision to step down as head of state, allowing for procedures for his 
replacement;100 (2) in his last address to the nation as President of 
Zimbabwe on November 19, 2017, Mugabe repeatedly stressed that the 
Military High Command’s intervention, namely, Operation Restore 
Legacy, was constitutional;101 (3) even the Chairperson of the African 
Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, welcomed the decision by 
President Mugabe on November 21, 2017, to step down from his 
position as head of state following a lifetime of service to the 
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, adopted Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414 
(entered into force July 11, 1991). 
98 See Ratification Status for Zimbabwe, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF 
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/ 
Treaty.aspx?CountryID=195&Lang=EN, (last visited Nov. 27, 2018). 
99 See Communiqué of The Summit of The Organ Troika Plus SADC Chair on The 
Political Situation in The Republic of Zimbabwe, SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
COMMUNITY, TOWARDS A COMMON FUTURE (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.sadc.int/news-
events/news/communique-summit-organ-troika-plus-sadc-chair-political-situation-
republic-zimbabwe/; see also Media Advisory, Southern African Development Community, 
SADC Organ Troika Plus Council Chairperson Ministerial Meeting on Zimbabwe Situation 
(Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.sadc.int/files/8515/1076/4955/Media_Advisory_-_SADC_ 
meet_on_Zimbabwe_situation.pdf; SADC: SADC Organ Troika Plus Council Chairperson 
Ministerial Meeting on Zimbabwe Situation, POLITY (Nov. 17, 2017), http://www.polity.org. 
za/article/sadc-sadc-organ-troika-plus-council-chairperson-ministerial-meeting-on-
zimbabwe-situatio-2017-11-17. 
100 Full Letter: Robert Mugabe’s Resignation Notice, NEWS24 (Nov. 21, 2017, 6:40 
PM), https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/full-letter-robert-mugabes-resignation-
notice-20171121. 
101 Zimbabwean President Mugabe Addresses Nation, CNN (Nov. 19, 2017), 
http://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2017/11/19/robert-mugabe-addresses-nation-full-
remarks.cnn. 
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Zimbabwean nation;102 and (4) the High Court of Zimbabwe Order of 
November 24, 2017, declared that the ZDF’s intervention to stop 
Mugabe’s unconstitutional actions were themselves constitutional 
under the Zimbabwean Constitution.103  
B. SADC Maneuverings Contrary to Kelsen’s Theory on the
Change of Grundnorm 
The heads of states of Angola, South Africa, Zambia, and others 
convened at an SADC Summit meeting under the Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security Cooperation on November 21, 2017, at Luanda, 
Angola, to discuss Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy in light of 
the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional 
takeover of power. The heads of states 
noted with great concern the unfolding political situation in the 
Republic of Zimbabwe, and resolved that H.E. President Jacob 
Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, in his capacity as the Chairperson of SADC, 
and H.E João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, in his capacity as 
Chairperson of the Organ on Politics[,] Defence and Security 
Cooperation will immediately undertake a mission to Zimbabwe on 
22 November, 2017 to assess the situation.104  
Clearly this norm is a blunt tool and a definite euphemism for the 
proposition that unpopular or illegitimate SADC leaders are 
immutable: touch them and the SADC comes after you. Once the 
“comrade-in-distress call” reaches the SADC Organ Troika, it has to 
act and act only to restore the unpopular or illegitimate leadership under 
siege from its own citizens. The ZDF was acutely aware of this fact 
from the beginning. 
Because of the SADC’s cautious approach to international human 
rights protection, it should not be allowed under International Law—
not even under Article 52 of Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter105 on 
Regional Arrangements—the power to stop citizens from using 
102 Addis Ababa, Statement of the Chairperson of the Commission of the Africa Union 
on the Situation in Zimbabwe, PEACE AND SEC. DEP’T OF AFR. UNION (Nov. 21, 2017), 
http://www. peaceau.org/uploads/auc-statement-zimbabwe-21nov2017english.pdf. 
103 Case No. HC 10820/17. 
104 Communiqué of The Summit of The Organ Troika Plus SADC Chair On The Political 
Situation In The Republic Of Zimbabwe, S. AFR. DEV. CMTY. (Nov. 21, 2017), 
http://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/communique-summit-organ-troika-plus-sadc-chair-
political-situation-republic-zimbabwe/. 
105 1 U.N.T.S. XVI. 
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revolutionary means to rid themselves of unpopular or illegitimate 
leadership. This is probably one of the unintended consequences of 
implementation of this norm in situations like Operation Restore 
Legacy. That would be contrary to the purposes and mission of the U.N. 
Charter.106  
Operation Restore Legacy recommends that the discretionary 
authorization of regional entities (and by implication subregional 
entities like the SADC) to take peace and security initiatives requires 
the U.N. Security Council to continually audit all regional and 
subregional peace and security arrangements for two things: fitness for 
purpose in view of human rights law and their legitimacy.  
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in the Asylum case107 
that the party invoking regional law must show that the other party had 
actually consented to be bound by that norm and had not merely 
acquiesced to it. By invoking the ancient Zimbabwean constitutional 
norm—Chimurenga/Inkululekho/Resistance of oppression—against 
the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional change 
of power, Zimbabwean citizens have demonstrated that they are not 
bound by SADC norms and practices that are indifferent to good 
governance. But it is the state that conducts international relations and 
not its citizens.  
This raises the question whether Zimbabwean citizens can bypass 
their state representatives and recuse themselves from previously 
agreed-upon international obligations. Perhaps they could, where their 
state representatives have usurped their trust and teamed up with others 
to establish counter–human rights protection initiatives contrary to the 
emergent U.N. human rights culture. Abuse of public trust might merit 
retraction from agreements established contrary to the expectations of 
that trust.  
In ex parte Pinochet Ugarte No.3,108 Lord Hope stated that acts of 
state leaders that are contrary to the functions of their offices are not 
protected by international law doctrines on the immunity of heads of 
state because, by their nature, they are neither required nor expected in 
the office bearer’s role. It could be argued that entering into counter–
good governance agreements that prevented political leaders from 
being removed from public office is not one of the reasons why the 
public invests its trust in those whom it elects. Under international law, 
106 See U.N. Charter art. 1 (Preamble). 
107 1950 I.C.J. 266. 
108 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte 
[2000] 1 A.C. 147 (HL). 
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should citizens be unable to disregard such treaty arrangements because 
they never entrusted their leaders to do any such thing on their behalf? 
If a leader transfers billions of national reserve funds to a foreign 
jurisdiction, he or she cannot later invoke immunity from prosecution 
because looting state funds is not the proper exercise of the trust 
invested in the office bearer by their citizens. According to Lord Hope: 
It may be said that it is not one of the functions of a head of state to 
commit acts which are criminal according to the laws and 
constitution of his own state or which customary international law 
regards as criminal. But I consider that this approach to the question 
is unsound in principle. The principle of immunity ratione materiae 
protects all acts which the head of state has performed in the exercise 
of the functions of government. The purpose for which they were 
performed protects these acts from any further analysis. There are 
only two exceptions to this approach which customary international 
law has recognised. The first relates to criminal acts which the head 
of state did under the colour of his authority as head of state but which 
were in reality for his own pleasure or benefit. . . . [T]he head of state 
who kills his gardener in a fit of rage or who orders victims to be 
tortured so that he may observe them in agony seem to me plainly to 
fall into this category and, for this reason, to lie outside the scope of 
the immunity. The second relates to acts the prohibition of which has 
acquired the status under international law of jus cogens.109 
In Operation Restore Legacy, Zimbabwean citizens may have cut 
themselves loose from the SADC indifference to good governance. 
Although international law requires good governance, the SADC 
appears to be indifferent to it. Perhaps there are at least two completely 
different views of the SADC: one of the citizenry, which contemplates 
the human rights requirements of internal self-determination, 
democratic rule, rule of law, and other tenets of good governance, and 
another that prioritizes leadership protection from recall from public 
office under the guise of peace and security initiatives.  
Unfortunately, development of SADC constitutional norms appears 
to have neglected the establishment of norms for the promotion of the 
SADC as contemplated by the citizenry. Rather, it has concentrated on 
promotion of an SADC for the protection of unpopular or illegitimate 
leadership from rejection by the citizens. This has created a David and 
Goliath situation between SADC populations on the one hand and 
unpopular or illegitimate leadership on the other.  
109 Id. 
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The citizenry’s ideals are closer to the values of good governance 
and democratic rule espoused by the United Nations than is the 
protection of political leaderships. But it is the political leadership that 
has international responsibility for Zimbabwe’s foreign relations. 
However, that responsibility is held only in trust for the citizens and 
their collective benefit. Therefore, where state authorities franchise 
citizens’ trust against citizens’ interests to deny them good governance, 
those same authorities can no longer claim to be appropriately 
exercising the trust of their citizens. This is because the United Nations 
has reconceptualized state security, moving away from  
traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focused 
primarily on the safety of states from military aggression, to one that 
concentrates on the security of the individuals, their protection and 
empowerment [by] . . . drawing attention to a multitude of threats 
that cut across different aspects of human life and thus, highlighting 
the interface between security, development and human rights; 
and . . . promoting a new integrated, coordinated and people-centered 
approach to advancing peace, security and development within and 
across nations.110 
Additionally, it seems appropriate to recommend that any requests 
related to “peace and security” from the SADC to the African Union, 
United Nations, European Union, and other entities to implement 
punitive measures against any named SADC state should always be 
treated with caution. This is because unconstitutional takeover of 
power in the subregion is often preceded by a record of successive 
stolen national assembly elections, denying affected populations of any 
other possibility of ending unpopular or illegitimate rule, or both.  
More importantly, Operation Restore Legacy recommends that any 
SADC intervention in any takeover of power scenario should be 
restricted. What turned out to be, in the words of both Robert Mugabe 
and the High Court of Zimbabwe, a very constitutional takeover of 
power from Mugabe had been declared illegal by both President Edgar 
Lungu of Zambia, the A.U. Chairperson, and the President of Gabon as 
it unfolded.111  
110 Human Security Unit, Human Security in Theory and Practice: Application of the 
Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, U.N. 
TRUST FUND FOR HUMAN SECURITY (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.tr.undp.org/content/dam/ 
turkey/docs/news-from-new-horizons/issue-41/UNDP-TR-HSHandbook_2009.pdf; see 
also Amartya Sen, Why Human Security, INT’L SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN SEC. (July 28, 
2000), http://www.ucipfg.com/Repositorio/MCSH/MCSH-05/BLOQUE-ACADEMICO/ 
Unidad-01/complementarias/3.pdf; Chigara, supra note 86, at 81. 
111 See A.U. WEBSITE, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/statement-by-the-chairperson-
of-auc-on-zimbabwe-ff.pdf. 
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President Lungu went further than others to threaten military action 
against Operation Restore Legacy. This is surprising because the 
majority of SADC states fought against foreign rule by the British, the 
Portuguese, and the Germans, protesting human rights abuses by their 
colonial masters. In some cases, the same liberators have become worse 
abusers of individual human rights than their former colonial masters.  
Further, the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition of 
unconstitutional takeover of power rules out Kelsen’s second means of 
possible change of the basic norm (grundnorm)—a revolution.112 This 
defies logic, particularly when the state of affairs has often deteriorated 
into abject political, social, and economic malaise. Moreover, the 
SADC’s own record of ensuring democratic elections is uninspiring. 
Even worse, the SADC has no credibility in resolving cases of stolen 
elections, hence its leadership’s instinctive clamors for the suppression 
of events like Operation Restore Legacy. This casts the SADC as a 
primitive safeguard of authoritarian rule. But, democratic entitlement 
has become the first building block of legitimacy and of good 
government under human rights law of the United Nations. 
Consequently, force alone is no longer sufficient to govern people. 
More importantly, through Operation Restore Legacy, 
Zimbabweans may have declared that they have entered an era in which 
only democracy and the rule of law113 will be the recognized test for 
governmental validity. This is because  
[t]o be effective, law needs to secure the habitual, voluntary
compliance of its subjects; it cannot rely entirely, or even primarily,
upon the commanding power of a sovereign to compel obedience.
Consequently, governments no longer blinded by totalitarian miasma
seek to validate themselves in such a way as to secure a high degree
of voluntary public acquiescence in the governing process. Consent
benefits the governing as much as the governed. . .114
The U.N. Secretary General has defined the rule of law as 
a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and 
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable 
to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and 
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with 
international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, 
112 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law: Its Method and Fundamental Concepts, Part 
I, 50 L.Q. REV. 474, 475 (1934). 
113 See TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW (2010). 
114 Franck, supra note 52, at 48. 
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measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, 
equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the 
application of the law, separation of powers, participation in 
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and 
procedural and legal transparency.115 
In spite of its best efforts to appear in agreement with this principle, 
the SADC needs to do more to merit the status of being in favor of the 
rule of law. Liesel Louw-Aaudran writes that the SADC’s intervention 
in Zimbabwe in the mid-2000s that led to the Government of National 
Unity (GNU) from 2008–2013 was severely criticized in many 
quarters: “Notably, crucial provisions of the Global Political 
Agreement that led to the GNU were not implemented. The AU also 
repeatedly rubber-stamped elections in Zimbabwe despite serious 
allegations of fraud.”116 This certainly disenfranchised Zimbabweans 
and protected SADC leadership’s “mentor,” Mr. Mugabe. 
Botswana President Ian Khama is widely reported to have declared 
the last Zimbabwe election a sham, while both the SADC and the 
African Union approved it as a free exercise of Zimbabweans’ will.117 
In frustration, President Khama is reported to have declared that his 
country would not participate in future SADC election observer 
missions after he noted what he says were irregularities in Zimbabwe’s 
disputed July 31 elections.118 He argued that both the African Union 
and the SADC had turned a blind eye to irregularities in last year’s 
[2013] Zimbabwe harmonized polls and accused the blocs of endorsing 
the elections even though they were not fair.119 
On November 15, the Chairperson of the Commission of the African 
Union, Moussa Faki Mahamat, urged that “all stakeholders . . . address 
the situation in accordance with Zimbabwe’s constitution and the 
relevant instruments of the African Union, including the African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.”120 This obsession 
115 U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. DOC. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004); United Nations and the 
Rule of Law, What Is the Rule of Law?, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-
law/. 
116 Liesl Louw-Vaudran, The African Union’s Chequered History with Military Coups, 
INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES (Nov. 22, 2017), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-african-unions-
chequered-history-with-military-coups. 




120 Statement of the Chairperson of the Commission of the Africa Union on the Situa-
tion in Zimbabwe, PEACE AND SEC. DEP’T OF AFR. UNION (Nov. 15, 2017), 
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with constitutions that house blunt tools for subjugating populations 
under dictatorial rule is a worrying trait among African states, and the 
SADC in particular. Unless the African Union and the SADC have 
previously ensured a free and fair election in a member state, they 
should not invoke democratic legitimacy to protect non-democratically 
installed regimes. This delegitimizes them both as intellectual wobblers 
that are ignorant of the value to good governance of what Thomas 
Franck described more than a quarter century ago as the “prescient 
glimpse of the legitimating power of the community of nations.”121 
Guinea’s President Alpha Condé, the then A.U. Chairperson, reacted 
in a similar vein at the start of Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy, 
stating that the African Union “will never accept a military coup d’état. 
We insist on the respect of the constitution and a return to constitutional 
rule.”122 Through various treaty instruments, the African Union has 
proscribed unconstitutional change of government, leading to the 
establishment of the Peace and Security Council,123 the African 
Union’s standing organ for the prevention, management, and resolution 
of conflicts.  
Nonetheless, constitutionalism that pays only lip service to 
democratic governance is inimical to peace-building because, as 
Operation Restore Legacy shows, democracy has become the sine qua 
non for legitimacy. In a nutshell, Operation Restore Legacy was born 
out of common revulsion among Zimbabweans against the Mugabe 
contrived family dynasty rule of Zimbabwe.  
According to Franck, the international community has vigorously 
asserted and established that “only democracy validates 
governance. . . . The transformation of the democratic entitlement from 
moral prescription to international legal obligation has evolved 
gradually. . . . [but] has accelerated. Most remarkable is the extent to 
which an international law-based entitlement is now urged by 
governments themselves.”124 Until the SADC can ensure that national 
assembly elections always guarantee a free and fair expression of the 
will of the states beyond a reasonable doubt, the SADC has a very weak 
https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20171115/statement-chairperson-african-union-commission-
situation-zimbabwe. 
121 Franck, supra note 52, at 46. 
122 Louw-Vaudran, supra note 116. 
123 Peace and Security Council (PSC), supra note 34. 
124 Franck, supra note 52, at 47. 
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and unsustainable case for insisting upon the implementation of its 
norm on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power. 
C. The Right to Internal Self-Determination: A Fundamental of the
United Nations’ Nomenclature on Peace, Security, and 
Development 
The right of citizens to internally determine freely who may govern 
them—by determining, for example, how they pursue their economic, 
social, and cultural development—occupies 
a central position in international law as a primary principle in the 
creation and destruction of states. It features in Article 1 of the UN 
Charter (1945) as one of the purposes of the organization. It is 
positioned as the first right in the twin Human Rights Covenants: 
ICCPR and ICESCR. Many commentators argue for its peremptory 
or jus cogens status.125 
Self-determination of peoples certainly belongs to the premier 
norms of the United Nations. This is specifically inscribed into the 
preamble of the U.N. Charter as one of the purposes for which the 
organization was established to achieve.126 Thus, the U.N. Trusteeship 
Council127 for overseeing the granting of political independence to non-
self-governing territories was established as one of the five organs of 
the United Nations.  
The right to self-determination is habitually referenced as an 
example of jus cogens. Lord Hope made it clear in ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte No. 3 that although the principle of immunity ratione materiae 
protects all acts which the head of state has performed in the exercise 
of the functions of government, it does not apply to acts prohibited by 
norms that have acquired the status of jus cogens under international 
law. “This compels all states to refrain from such conduct under any 
circumstances and imposes an obligation erga omnes to punish such 
conduct.”128 
125 James Summers, Self-Determination in International Law, OXFORD 
BIBLIOGRAPHIES (June 27, 2017), http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/ 
obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0033.xml. 
126 U.N. Charter, art. 1 (Preamble). 
127 Id. at art. 75–91. This replaced the institutions of the mandate under the Covenant of 
the League of Nations; see also MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 508 (Max 
Sorensen ed., MacMillan & Co. 1968). 
128 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte 
[2000] 1 A.C. 147 (HL). 
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Consequently, any treaty calculated to place restrictions on jus 
cogens or to deny its effect is null and void under international law.129 
SADC treaties that conflict with the jus cogens guarantees of internal 
self-determination of peoples may not be valid after all. 
The U.N. General Assembly confirmed the significance of the self-
determination of peoples norm under modern international law in 
Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960.130 The resolution’s 
preamble131 sets out the following principles: (1) the need to remove all 
impediments to freedom as a means of abating serious threats to world 
peace; (2) the need to promote social progress and better standards of 
life and larger freedom; (3) the need for the creation of conditions of 
stability and well-being and peaceful and friendly relations based on 
respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all 
peoples; and the need for universal respect for, and observance of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.132  
Paragraph six of the resolution states that “[a]ny attempt aimed at 
the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations.”133 
The resolution concludes with the clarion call upon all states to 
“[o]bserve faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the 
internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all 
peoples and their territorial integrity.”134  
Thus, it is incontestable that the right to self-determination is critical 
to international law’s imagination on how to ensure stability, peace, 
and security. The resolution refers to “sovereign rights of all 
peoples.”135 These rights must include the right of a population to 
129 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 136 (1994). 
130 UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. II No. 5 (June 1965) p. 55; G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 66 
(Dec. 14, 1960). 
131 Often cited as a good example of soft law or binding resolutions. See OBED 
ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1966); MARTINUS NIJHOFF, THE HAGUE; ROSA 
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963). 
132 See G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 130.  
133 Id. at ¶ 6. 
134 Id.  
135 Id. (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples). 
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remove a government that, in its eyes, has lost legitimacy to continue 
to govern—internal self-determination, which is quite apart from 
external self-determination. The latter refers to the independence of a 
state to freely determine matters of its external relations with other 
states without prior authorization of other states.  
Each time the SADC has partially intervened (Zimbabwe, 2017, 
Operation Restore Legacy) or fully intervened (Lesotho, 1998; DRC, 
1998; Madagascar, 2010), its major effect has not been to prevent an 
escalation of violence and disorder in the target state but to put down 
mass expressions of governmental illegitimacy absent the possibility of 
dismissing the same government by the ballot box for the national 
assembly.  
V 
NORMATIVE EVOLUTION OF THE NORM AGAINST 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKEOVER OF POWER 
The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was first 
launched in June 1996 as a formal institution for ensuring and 
maintaining security and the rule of law in the subregion.136 The 
Protocol establishing the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in 
the SADC Region137 (the Treaty)138 was signed and opened for 
ratification in 1997. On August 14, 2001, SADC heads of state and 
government signed in Blantyre, Malawi, a new Protocol on Politics, 
Defense and Security Cooperation, which provides an institutional 
framework by which member states can coordinate policies and 
activities in the areas of politics, defense, and security, thereby 
formalizing the SADC Organ first launched in 1996.139 Subsequently, 
the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) was signed in 2004, 
and provided a view to operationalizing the objectives set forth in the 
new Protocol signed at Blantyre.140  
SIPO appears to be a perfectly valid international treaty, as it 
satisfies the general and specific requirements for treaties outlined in 
136 Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, supra note 46. 
137 The Protocol, supra note 47. 
138 See Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), opened for signature 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 20, 1980). 
139 Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, supra note 46. 
140 Southern African Development Community [SADC], Protocol on Politics, Defence 
and Security Co-Operation, https://www.sadc.int/files/3613/5292/8367/Protocol_on_ 
Politics_Defence_and_Security20001.pdf. 
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the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).141 
International tribunals and national courts habitually rely on the 
material provisions of the VCLT to ascertain traditional rules on the 
law of treaties.142 Nonetheless, the legality of treaties in international 
law must be tested against the relevant and applicable provisions of the 
United Nations Charter.143 Moreover, in several of its provisions, the 
Organ itself makes it explicitly clear that it remains subservient to the 
U.N. Charter. Article 52(1) of the U.N. Charter authorizes regional 
arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
but withholds recognition by the United Nations of any regional treaty 
arrangements that undermine the “Purposes and Principles of the 
UN.”144  
But for the intervention of the SADC, the governments of target 
states would have collapsed. Whatever the SADC executive’s initial 
intentions, practice of the norm on the absolute prohibition of 
unconstitutional change of government shows that this norm has 
become a double-edged cutting sword that on the one hand potentially 
could be applied to limit intrastate conflicts, but on the other hand can 
be cruelly used to deny oppressed populations the only possible means 
left for them to get rid of an oppressive government.  
The implementation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security on September 22, 1998, against Lesotho145 and SADC 
attempts to invoke it against Zimbabwe’s perfectly constitutional 
Operation Restore Legacy show that, absent another robust 
countervailing SADC Organ for protecting citizens from national 
assembly electoral fraud of incumbent governments, SIPO, which 
operationalizes the Blantyre Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation, can frustrate democracy by perpetuating oppressive 
illegitimate governments. For Zimbabweans, that would be 
unacceptable because it would effectively undo the expression of their 
141 Id. at art. 1, 6, 7, 9 and 24. 
142 See Daniel Reichert-Facilides, Down the Danube: The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties and the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 47 INT’L & 
COMP. L. Q. 837 (1998); SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES: 
1945–1986 (1989); CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993). 
143 See U.N. Charter.  
144 U.N. Charter, art. 52(1). 
145 Puleng Thetela, Critique Discourses and Ideology in Newspaper Reports: A 
Discourse Analysis of the South African Press Reports on the 1998 SADC’s Military 
Intervention in Lesotho, 12 Discourse and Society 347–70 (2001).  
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dignity, summed up in their ancient constitutional convention of 
Chimurenga (Shona) or Inkululekho (Ndebele).146 
Chimurenga/Inkululekho is Zimbabwe’s foremost practiced 
constitutional convention.147 It is evident in both their precolonial and 
postcolonial histories. It is what Operation Restore Legacy was all 
about—namely, to stop the Mugabes from treating the nation as 
personal property. Chimurenga/Inkululekho opposes all the adverse 
effects of the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition of 
unconstitutional change of government.148 Zimbabweans themselves 
executed Operation Restore Legacy in a peaceful medium that the 
intended operationalization of the SADC norm would have shattered. 
Moreover, Zimbabwean courts have ruled that Operation Restore 
Legacy did not breach any of the strictures of the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe.149 This raises the question whether the SADC norm on the 
absolute prohibition of unconstitutional change of government is at all 
needed by the peoples of the SADC.  
VI 
OPERATION RESTORE LEGACY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER150 
Advocates of international constitutionalism often exaggerate some 
of their claims by making replete assumptions from which they then 
cascade arguments for the proposition that emergent international and 
regional value systems are valid processes for the reorganization and 
reallocation of competencies among the traditional and post-1945 
emergent subjects of the international legal system.151  
They argue, sometimes profusely and often hyperbolically, that the 
Westphalia state-based model of international order has declined so 
much that it has become unfeasible to describe international law 
146 See Online Translator, https://vashona.com/en/translator. 
147 Woolford, supra note 10; First Chimurenga, supra note 11; Machivenyika, supra 
note 12.  
148 Blantyre Protocol, supra note 26. 
149 Maveriq, supra note 6. 
150 See U.N. International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006). 
151 See Erika de Wet, The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a 
Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 
611 (2006). 
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through the action of states alone.152 They tend to invoke norms of jus 
cogens, which refer to no more than a handful of norms in public 
international law,153 and to human rights processes that are firmly 
dependent on previous exhaustion of domestic/state remedies as a basis 
for their claims of phenomenal transformation of the dynamic of 
international order. In part, Operation Restore Legacy appears to be a 
robust challenge of some of these exaggerations. It points to the 
resilience of ancient national conventions that contradict subregional 
and even regional constitutional frameworks that lack logical diligence 
to capture the United Nations’ aspirations for democratic rule and the 
United Nations’ normative requirements on internal self-determination 
of peoples.154 By failing to accommodate cardinal principles of the 
United Nations and requirements of jus cogens in its normative 
framework, the SDAC norm on the absolute prohibition against 
unconstitutional takeover of power shows a very low logical diligence 
as no later norm of a lesser quality could challenge the United Nations’ 
jus cogens on the right to self-determination. “Internal self-
determination is the right of the people of a state to govern themselves 
without outside interference.”155 Consequently, “other states should 
not, through appeals or pressure, seek to prevent a people from freely 
selecting its own political, economic, and social system.”156 
By any measure, Zimbabwe’s foremost and enduring convention in 
social ordering is the core value of Chimurenga/Inkululekho or 
resistance to oppression that its people are historically linked to and 
well known for.157 However, the core constitutional value set of the 
regional African Union and subregional SADC includes the 
requirement to submit even to governments enthroned amid justifiable 
claims of electoral fraud. Certain entities help to ensure these values, 
152 Aoife O’Donoghue, International Constitutionalism and the State, 11 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 1022 (2013). 
153 See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
243–44 (8th ed. 2012). 
154 See Kalana Senaratne, Internal Self-Determination in International Law: A Critical 
Third-World Perspective, 3 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 305 (2013). 
155 THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SELF-DETERMINATION, https://pesd.princeton. 
edu/?q=node/254 (last visited Sept. 1, 2018).  
156 Salvatore Senese, External and Internal Self-Determination, 16 SOC. JUST. 19 
(1989). 
157 See DAVID MARTIN, THE STRUGGLE FOR ZIMBABWE (Faber & Faber 1982); DAVID 
COLTART, THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES: 50 YEARS OF TYRANNY IN ZIMBABWE (2016). 
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such as the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC)158 and 
the SADC’s Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defense, 
Politics and Security.159 The African Union’s website describes the 
PSC as “the standing organ of the AU for the prevention, management 
and resolution of conflicts. It is a key element of the African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA), which is the umbrella term for the main 
AU mechanisms for promoting peace, security and stability in 
Africa.”160 
The attempt by the Mugabes to institutionalize a dynasty rule of 
Zimbabwe in 2017 resulted in a clash between the ancient national 
convention of the Chimurenga/Inkululekho/Resistance to oppression 
and the SADC and African Union norm on the absolute prohibition 
against unconstitutional takeover of power. Professor Philip 
Rosessler161 protests that by not intervening to halt Operation Restore 
Legacy, the African Union got it wrong.  
 The African Union, in alignment with SADC, got it wrong and 
missed a valuable opportunity to strengthen and expand its anti-coup 
regime to include both de jure and de facto coups. In narrowly 
focusing on the removal of the sitting head of state as the defining 
feature of a coup rather than the unconstitutional use of force to 
coerce elected leaders to relinquish power, it sets a dangerous 
precedent that threatens to undermine the strong gains the region has 
made to move beyond politics by the gun.162  
In Rosessler’s view, ancient national conventions that have the 
support of the norms of the United Nations’ cardinal International Bill 
of Human Rights and jus cogens count for nothing. While he correctly 
observes that the African Union has for years turned “a blind eye to 
President Mugabe’s subversion of democracy,” he maintains that 
 [a] sounder approach would have been for the AU’s Peace and
Security Council to condemn the de facto coup—as it would a de jure 
coup—and threaten to suspend Zimbabwe from the African Union 
until the military released Mugabe from house arrest, handed over 
158 The PSC is the standing organ of the African Union for the prevention, management, 
and resolution of conflicts. The A.U. website describes it as “a key element of the African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is the umbrella term for the main AU 
mechanisms for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.” Peace and Security 
Council (PSC), supra note 34. 
159 SIPO, supra note 25. 
160 Peace and Security Council (PSC), supra note 34.  
161 Philip Rosessler, How the African Union Got It Wrong on Zimbabwe, ALJAZEERA 
(Dec. 5, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/african-union-wrong-zimbabwe-
171204125847859.html. 
162 Id. 
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power to a transitional post-Mugabe government, and returned to the 
barracks. Such a policy response would have delivered a similar 
outcome as what transpired—ridding Zimbabwe and the AU of the 
Mugabe problem—while strengthening, rather than weakening, the 
region’s anti-coup norm. Instead, the AU endorsed a factional coup 
by the Zimbabwe military and its former vice president, Mnangagwa, 
that now sees the coup perpetrators in key positions in the post-
Mugabe government in direct contravention of the African Charter 
on Democracy, Elections and Governance.163 
Clearly, Operation Restore Legacy had to climb behind the steep 
protections of both the African Union and SADC regime protectionist 
values in order to ensure a stop to the contrived Mugabe dynasty rule. 
This highlights the tension between the national core value of 
Chimurenga/Inkululekho/Resistance to oppression and the 
protectionist value sets that champion the sanctity of de facto 
governments, whatever their disposition—even over one of the United 
Nation’s most cherished goals of democratic governance under Article 
25 of ICCPR or the SADC and the African Union’s professed 
democratic governance among their member states.  
The success of Operation Restore Legacy is underlined by the 
following: (1)  a stop to the Mugabe contrived dynasty rule of 
Zimbabwe; (2) a successful circumvention of both SADC and African 
Union de facto government protectionist mechanisms; (3) achievement 
of the popular will of Zimbabweans adverse to African Union and 
SADC mechanisms; and (4) manifest national peace and security 
greater than that immediately preceding the operation. 
This outcome tentatively recommends the view that national 
conventions can potentially penetrate and bust subregional and regional 
value systems that have the potential to subvert cardinal principles and 
aspirations of international law. This includes the right to democratic 
governance promoted by international human rights law for the purpose 
of promoting and ensuring international peace and security. 
CONCLUSION 
Zimbabwe’s Operation Restore Legacy has exposed fundamental 
flaws in the constitutional values of the SADC. These flaws pertain to 
the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition against unconstitutional 
takeover of power. Where the normative structures of subregional or 
163 Id. 
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regional institutions have not developed diligently enough to inscribe 
the cardinal requirements of United Nations law into their constitutive 
formulations and operational mechanisms, the U.N. Security Council 
has a close monitoring responsibility. Such monitoring ensures the 
peace and security competencies delegated to regional institutions and 
agencies are not applied inconsistently to local general constitutional 
principles, which are enshrined in enduring ancient national 
conventions of member states and backed by human rights standards of 
the United Nations. Chimurenga/Inkululekho/Resistance of oppression 
is an example of such principles.  
First, the recognition under public international law of general 
principles of law by members of the relevant community is a mainstay 
of the sources of international law under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute 
of the ICJ.164 Second, any failure of the U.N. Security Council to ensure 
the aforementioned will likely result in grave breaches of international 
peace and security. Citizens will not stand by while unpopular or 
illegitimate leaders seek to remain in authority by invoking the rules of 
leaders’ survival organizations, such as the SADC. Citizens will, as 
Operation Restore Legacy has shown, reject the application of any such 
rules to their affairs by actively challenging them and insisting on 
application of their local ancient and enduring conventional norms such 
as Chimurenga/Inkululekho/Resistance of oppression. 
The ICJ clarified in the Asylum case that where a party seeks to rely 
on a regional norm qua customary international law, it must show that 
the other party actually consented to be bound by that norm and not 
merely acquiesced to it.165 By invoking the ancient Zimbabwean 
constitutional norm against the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition 
of unconstitutional change of power, Zimbabweans have demonstrated 
that they want nothing to do with SADC norms and practices that are 
indifferent to the United Nations’ requirements on good governance 
and international law requirements on democratic governance. 
Zimbabweans may have very well struck the first body blow to the 
SADC’s decrepit value system. 
There are several lessons for the United Nations, the African Union, 
and the SADC to draw from Operation Restore Legacy. For the United 
Nations, the hyperbole about the decline of the significance of the state 
in the normative arrangements for peace and security often rehearsed 
164 See BEN CHIGARA, LEGITIMACY DEFICIT IN CUSTOM: A DECONSTRUCTIONIST 
CRITIQUE, (Ashgate, Aldershot 2001). 
165 1950 I.C.J. 266. 
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in the literature on constitutionalism is questionable. Ancient national 
conventions of constitutional significance can still, as Operation 
Restore Legacy has shown, prevail over subregional and regional 
institutions unless the latter have been diligently established and their 
implementation mechanisms synchronized consistently with the 
aspirations of both the United Nations and local populations’ 
constitutional values.  
Membership of the SADC does not necessarily dispense with 
ancient fundamental conventions of states. On the contrary, the SADC 
would enhance its legitimacy by developing operational standards and 
mechanisms for the implementation of Article 5 goals of the SADC 
Treaty by drawing extensively on the ancient and enduring conventions 
of member states. The conflict between the SADC norm on the absolute 
prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power and Zimbabwe’s 
constitutional convention of Chimurenga/Inkululekho/Resistance of 
oppression was resolved in Operation Restore Legacy in favor of the 
latter, thereby casting enormous doubt on the legitimacy of the SADC’s 
value system. 
If the SADC prioritized the promotion and assurance of good 
governance in the subregion, it could wipe out all the costs associated 
with implementation of the norm on the absolute prohibition of 
unconstitutional takeover of power in defense of unpopular or 
illegitimate leadership. Additionally, if it chose to promote good 
governance, it would serve to enhance economic performance of 
member states by building the confidence of foreign investors. Similar 
benefits could accrue to the African Union if it prioritized good 
governance over the protection of unpopular or illegitimate leaders 
through operationalization of some of its Peace and Security Council 
initiatives. 
International support and acquiescence with Operation Restore 
Legacy appears to have stemmed from a recognition of the SADC’s 
democratic deficit. Absent a practice of genuine democratic 
governance among SADC member states, third party states will 
generally find it difficult to condemn events like Operation Restore 
Legacy. Therefore, the SADC urgently needs to promote and ensure 
democratic governance among member states by establishing a parallel 
constitutional normative structure of equal weight to the norm on the 
absolute prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power in order to 
ensure the absolute sanctity of the national assembly ballot. As a 
216 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 20, 173 
precondition to the continued operation and enforcement of the norm 
on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional change of government, 
the new norm must have a similar if not stronger monitoring and 
enforcement mechanism than the SADC’s current norm.  
Implementation of the SADC norm on the absolute prohibition of 
unconstitutional takeover of power presupposes that citizens of the 
target state have a realistic possibility of removing the unpopular or 
illegitimate leadership via national assembly ballots. However, 
conducting free and fair democratic elections is still a big challenge for 
most African states, including those of the SADC. Zimbabwe itself has 
not even ratified the regional African Charter on Democracy, Elections 
and Governance adopted by the African Union on January 30, 2007.166 
In fact, Zimbabwe has not even signed the Charter. 
Therefore, without the guarantee that SADC populations have 
realistic opportunities periodically to choose who governs over them as 
required under Article 25 of the ICCPR, the norm on the absolute 
prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power is nonsense on 
stilts.167 Insisting upon this norm in the absence of such a guarantee 
makes the SADC a surrogate for all unpopular or illegitimate regimes 
in the subregion. It can be applied to protect unpopular or illegitimate 
leaders from “other means” of removal from office while the national 
assembly ballot remains an unlikely avenue for citizens to replace such 
leadership.  
The SADC’s reserved and cautious approach to monitoring by 
international human rights treaty bodies is further reason why the norm 
on the absolute prohibition of unconstitutional takeover of power needs 
to be counterbalanced by another respecting the absolute sanctity of 
national assembly ballots. It is unconscionable that a subregional 
organization comprised of states with such a terrible attitude to 
ensuring protection of individuals’ human rights should guarantee 
political leaders protection from “other” means of removal from power, 
when in many cases national assembly ballots offer no realistic 
possibilities to change leadership. 
Operation Restore Legacy could also be characterized as a warning 
to the SADC, the African Union, and the new Zimbabwe 
administration of what to expect from this unique people comprising 
166 See African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, http://www.achpr.org/ 
instruments/charter-democracy/. 
167 See Philip Schofield, JEREMY BENTHAM’S NONSENSE UPON STILTS, 15 UTILITAS 1–
26 (2003).  
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several tribes that are bound by the same common trait. In fact, 
throughout Operation Restore Legacy, Zimbabweans forgot any other 
inclination of personal identity and immersed themselves in 
Chimurenga/Inkululekho/Resistence to oppression—the struggle that 
had to be accomplished.168 Zimbabweans prevailed against 
maneuverings by the SADC and the African Union, and will prevail 
again, and again, if so required. Chimurenga/Inkululekho is the only 
way they know how to proceed against oppression.  
SADC values on the protection of de facto regimes must change to 
end potential conflict with enduring and unchanging ancient national 
conventions that seek to promote and uphold cardinal principles of the 
United Nations for ensuring international peace and security by 
advocating and advancing good governance and promoting 
international human rights law. 
168 See generally DAVID MARTIN, THE STRUGGLE FOR ZIMBABWE (1982); DAVID 
COLTART, THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES: 50 YEARS OF TYRANNY IN ZIMBABWE (2016). 
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